

## Large Cap Growth - Covid-19 Commentary

As you all may know, we normally do not comment on any one quarter of market action. However, given one of the biggest and also the fastest market corrections in history, we wanted to provide you our thoughts and perspective regarding the Covid-19 crisis.

First and foremost, we hope all of you and your loved ones are healthy. For those who have been impacted we wish you solace in these difficult times.

"In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine." What Ben Graham describes is the result of innate behavioral biases that we believe drive reflexive overreactions to short-term market variables that, when viewed rationally, have no impact on longterm value.

First, we want to provide you with a performance update. In short, the strategy significantly outperformed its benchmarks and peers – especially during the drawdown. We normally utilize eVestment data, but as these figures are not available for daily returns for composites, we are providing you with Lipper figures in the table immediately below to highlight our intra-quarter performance. The rest of the peer data that follows is from eVestment unless otherwise noted.

LOOMIS SAYLES LARGE CAP GROWTH REPRESENTATIVE ACCOUNT - PERFORMANCE FROM PEAK

Performance Periods <sup>3</sup>	LS LCG Rep Account Returns (Gross) <sup>1</sup>	LS LCG Rep Account Returns (Net) <sup>1</sup>	Lipper Peer Rank (%) <sup>2</sup>	Russell 1000 Growth Return	Excess Return (Gross)	S&P 500 Return*	Excess Return (Gross)
Peak to trough: 2/20/2020 - 3/23/2020	-26.39%	-26.41%	1	-31.46%	5.07%	-33.79%	7.40%
Since Peak: 2/20/2020 - 3/31/2020	-17.47%	-17.49%	1	-21.38%	3.91%	-23.48%	6.01%

Data source: Loomis Sayles, Lipper.

Lipper LCG primary share peer rankings (gross) are shown for peak to trough and since peak periods due to availability of data; Lipper provides daily rankings where eVestment does not. Strategy returns are based on a representative account.

\*The benchmark for the Large Cap Growth Composite is the Russell 1000 Growth Index. Performance for the S&P 500 Index is shown as supplemental information.

Ranking out of 153 observations; (Lipper's US Large Cap Growth Universe).

LOOMIS SAYLES LARGE CAP GROWTH COMPOSITE - TRAILING RETURNS AS OF MARCH 31, 2020

Performance Periods	LS LCG Composite Returns (Gross) <sup>1</sup>	LS LCG Composite Returns (Net) <sup>1</sup>	eVestment Alliance Peer Rank (%)	Russell 1000 Growth Return	Excess Return (Gross)	S&P 500 Return*	Excess Return (Gross)
Q1 2020	-11.23%	-11.33%	13	-14.10%	2.87%	-19.60%	8.37%
1 Year	1.39%	0.97%	28	0.91%	0.48%	- <b>6.98</b> %	8.37%
3 Year	12.57%	12.11%	28	11.32%	1.25%	5.10%	7.47%
5 Year	12.23%	11.77%	9	10.36%	1.87%	6.73%	5.50%
10 Year	14.28%	13.84%	8	12 <b>.97</b> %	1.31%	10.53%	3.75%
Since inception: 7/1/2006 <sup>4</sup>	12.31%	11.82%	3	9.95%	2.36%	7.54%	4.77%

Data source: Loomis Sayles, eVestment Alliance.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

\*The benchmark for the Large Cap Growth Composite is the Russell 1000 Growth Index. Performance for the S&P 500 Index is shown as supplemental information.

Peer rankings are based on eVestment Large Cap Growth Universe (gross). Returns greater than one year are annualized. Please see trailing returns and other statistics as of the most recent quarter-end at the end of this document.



We are an active manager with a long-term, private equity approach to investing. Our investment process relies 100% on bottom-up fundamental research. Through our proprietary research framework, we look to invest in those few high-quality businesses with sustainable competitive advantages and profitable growth only when they trade at a significant discount to intrinsic value. Because we approach investing as if we are buying into a private business, a long investment horizon is central to our philosophy. Since inception on July 1, 2006<sup>4</sup> through March 31, 2020, the long-term annualized turnover for our Large Cap Growth strategy is 12.7%.

Over the last 100 years, the world endured many alarming, unexpected, and damaging events including world wars and other regional conflicts, the Great Depression, the Tech Bubble, the attacks of 9/11, the financial crises of 2008-2009, an oil shock and an oil bubble, and the SARS virus. These events almost always impact short-term economy and market performance to varying degrees. Nevertheless, over the long term, markets have trended upward. The Dow Jones Industrial Average rose from 107.23 at the end of 1919 to 28,538.44 by the end of 2019.

We do not know exactly what will happen as a result of Covid-19; nor does anyone else. Nor can most of these types of events be predicted. We believe efforts to precisely predict the timing, duration, and magnitude of these events are futile. The good news is we believe one need not predict these events to be prepared for the events. The best preparation requires, we believe, a consistent and disciplined ability to do the right thing every day; that is to allocate capital rationally based on informed views of risk-reward. Our approach as an investment manager is to allocate capital to our most compelling reward-to-risk opportunities, regardless of the type of market or short-term events. Doing so requires the knowledge to establish a range of valuation outcomes or scenarios. When buying a business, we require at least a 2:1 anticipated upside-to-downside, reward-to-risk opportunity. We seek to create a margin of safety<sup>5</sup> by investing at a purchase price that is at a meaningful discount to our estimate of a company's intrinsic value. Investing with a margin of safety requires not only a disciplined understanding of a company's intrinsic value but a clear recognition of what the market price implies about consensus expectations for that company's value. Adhering to this discipline is what helps us manage downside risk, not attempting to correctly forecast unknowable and unforecastable events. Implementing our approach demands the temperament and concomitant discipline to be a contrarian who can buy into fear and sell into greed.

Consider our performance in 2008, during the financial crisis; our Large Cap Growth strategy outperformed the Russell 1000 Growth index by 10.40% (gross) and ranked in the 4<sup>th</sup> percentile among our peer group. Our strategy also outperformed in 2009, giving us an annualized positive 2-year return of 0.81% and ranked in the 1<sup>st</sup> percentile among our LCG peer group (ranked by eVestment Alliance out of 457 observations). Over our track record (July 1, 2006 through March 31, 2020), our strategy's maximum drawdown of 38.73% ranks in the 3<sup>rd</sup> percentile among our LCG peers with our Calmar ratio<sup>6</sup> of 0.32, ranking in the 1st percentile.

As of 3/31/2020	Large Cap Growth	Peer Rank	Count
Excess return 2008 (gross)	10.40%	4 <sup>th</sup>	487
Annualized return 2008-2009 (gross)	0.81%	<b>1</b> st	457
Maximum drawdown since inception	-38.73%	3 <sup>rd</sup>	191
Calmar ratio since inception	0.32	1 <sup>st</sup>	191

Peer rankings are based on eVestment Large Cap Growth Universe (gross). Returns greater than one year are annualized. **Past performance is no guarantee of future results.** 

Please see trailing returns and other statistics as of the most recent quarter-end at the end of this document.



Our active risk management is an integral part of our active investment process. Because we define risk as a permanent loss of capital, we take an absolute-return approach to investing and seek to actively manage our downside risk. Also, as important, most investors only focus on the risk they can see and it is usually the risk that is unforeseen and unexpected that has the most impact, especially at inflection points and in down markets. This is important given the number of negative return periods the Russell 1000 Growth Index experiences. Over the last 36 years, 38% of the Index's monthly returns were negative, 28% of quarterly returns were negative, and 19% of yearly returns were negative. Over our track record through March 31, 2020, the Index experienced 12 negative quarters with gross returns ranging from -0.77% to -22.79%. Our Large Cap Growth strategy outperformed the Index in 9 out of the 12 quarters, with a median excess return of 2.67% (gross). Over our track record through March 31, 2020, our strategy also outperformed our LCG peer group in 10 out of the 12 quarters, with a median excess return of 2.67% (gross). Who could have consistently forecasted all these down periods and up markets?

Down Quarter	R1000 Growth Return	LCG Gross Return	Excess Gross Return LS LCG vs R1000G	Median LCG Peer Gross Return	Excess Gross Return LS LCG vs Median LCG Peer	Peer Universe Count
Q4 2007	-0.77%	-3.22%	-2.45%	0.10%	-3.32%	228
Q1 2008	-10.18%	-10.40%	-0.22%	-10.48%	0.08%	234
Q3 2008	-12.33%	-1 <b>.97</b> %	10.36%	-12.12%	10.15%	235
Q4 2008	-22.79%	-18.69%	4.10%	-22.31%	3.62%	235
Q1 2009	-4.12%	-1.87%	2.25%	-4.09%	2.22%	236
Q2 2010	-11.75%	-12.35%	-0.61%	-11.62%	-0.73%	243
Q3 2011	-13.14%	-10.68%	2.46%	-14.39%	3.71%	249
Q2 2012	-4.02%	-3.86%	0.16%	-4.98%	1.12%	250
Q4 2012	-1.32%	3.26%	4.58%	-0.79%	4.05%	251
Q3 2015	-5.29%	-2.35%	2.94%	-5.95%	3.59%	269
Q4 2018	-15.89%	-11.58%	4.30%	-15.24%	3.66%	254
Q1 2020	-14.10%	-11.23%	2.87%	-14.34%	3.11%	259
	Range		-2.45% to 10.36%		-3.32% to 10.15%	
	Median		2.67%		3.35%	

### PERFORMANCE IN NEGATIVE QUARTERS

Data source: eVestment Alliance.

Peer rankings are based on eVestment Large Cap Growth Universe (gross). Returns greater than one year are annualized. **Past performance is no guarantee of future results.** 

Please see trailing returns and other statistics as of the most recent quarter-end at the end of this document.

Ultimately, our job as an investment manager is to allocate capital to our most compelling reward-torisk opportunities. Over our track record through March 31, 2020, gross annualized returns for our Large Cap Growth strategy rank in the 3<sup>rd</sup> percentile, better than 97% of our LCG peers. What's more, ours is one of the few large cap growth strategies to rank in the top quartile for both down market and up market capture, with statistics of 92.54 and 103.15, respectively. For alpha generation, we believe the pursuit of greater upside potential and managing absolute levels of risk are inextricable goals.



#### RISK/RETURN PROFILE: DOWNSIDE MARKET CAPTURE

Firm Name	Product Name	Downside Market Capture - (07/2006 - 3/2020) Using Russell 1000 Growth	Rank	Upside Market Capture - (07/2006 - 3/2020) Using Russell 1000 Growth	Rank	Information Ratio - (07/2006 - 3/2020) Using Russell 1000 Growth	Annualized Alpha - (07/2006 - 3/2020) Using Russell 1000 Growth
Loomis Sayles	LCG	92.54	15	103.15	24	0.51	2.63
Summary Statistics For Peer Group with Better Downside Capture Than Loomis Sayles LCG (count = 38)							
Summary St	atistics For F	eer Group with Be	etter Dov	whside Capture Th	an Loom	is Sayles LCG (co	ount = 38)
Avera		eer Group with Be 85.94	etter Dov 6	85.34	an Loom 93	-0.11	0.82
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### RISK/RETURN PROFILE: UPSIDE MARKET CAPTURE

Firm Name	Product Name	Downside Market Capture - (07/2006 - 3/2020) Using Russell 1000 Growth	Rank	Upside Market Capture - (07/2006 - 3/2020) Using Russell 1000 Growth	Rank	Information Ratio - (07/2006 - 3/2020) Using Russell 1000 Growth	Annualized Alpha - (07/2006 - 3/2020) Using Russell 1000 Growth
Loomis Sayles	LCG	92.54	15	103.15	24	0.51	2.63
Summary S	Statistics For	Peer Group with	Better U	pside Capture Tha	ר Loomis	Sayles LCG (cou	nt = 45)
Avera	ge	106.28	84	109.26	9	0.14	0.10
Min		96.42	25	103.23	24	-0.26	-2.56
Max		119.51	100	128.75	1	0.63	2.43

Source: eASE Analytics System. Ranking out of 193 observations. eVestment Alliance's US Large Cap Growth Universe.) Excludes one strategy with a combined track record, low-volatility strategies, managed volatility strategies, enhanced equity strategies, and strategies with inception dates after 7/1/2006. Annualized performance is calculated as the geometric mean of the product's returns with respect to one year. Returns-based data are gross of management fees and net of trading costs. The highest (or most favorable) percentile rank is 1, and the lowest (or least favorable) percentile rank is 100. Rankings are subject to change. Although we believe it is reliable, we cannot guarantee the accuracy of data from a third party source. This information cannot be copied or redistributed in any form.

#### Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Please see trailing returns and other statistics as of the most recent quarter-end at the end of this document.

In our view, a long investment horizon affords us an opportunity to capture value from secular growth opportunities as well as capitalize on the stock market's shortsightedness through a process called time arbitrage. Therefore we attempt to identify intrinsic value and exploit the long-term differential between this value and the market's current perception. We measure and monitor our long-term investment thesis for each company through bottom-up analysis of a company's fundamentals, not by the fluctuation in daily stock prices. Our approach always seeks to look beyond the current environment as we have a truly long-term investment time horizon. In any binary or non- binary event, the key question we ask ourselves is if the outcome would materially change the underlying long-term intrinsic value of the businesses that we invest in. Or, in other words, would the event/scenario structurally alter the competitive positioning, competitive advantage, financial model, management, long-term growth rate or driver for growth such that these changes would alter the underlying intrinsic value of the company. What's happening today or on a daily basis does not dictate what we will do for the long-term. The only relevance of what is happening in any environment is our pursuit of taking advantage of what is presented to us in terms of attractive investment opportunities.

LOOMIS SAYLES

In this market downturn, our strategy once again outperformed the Russell 1000 Growth Index and the S&P 500 Index and ranked in the first percentile among our Lipper peers during the drawdown period beginning February 20, 2020. It is our opinion that the Covid-19 scenario does not, in and of itself, meaningfully change any of the key criteria listed above. As always, we remain vigilant to developments that do meaningfully alter the long-term investment thesis for any company in our portfolio or investment library.



TRAILING RETURNS AS OF 6/30/2022

Data Source: Loomis Sayles and the Frank Russell Company.

\* The benchmark for the Large Cap Growth Composite is the Russell 1000 Growth Index. Performance for the S&P 500 Index is shown as supplemental information.

The Manager for the Large Cap Growth Composite joined Loomis Sayles on May 19, 2010, and performance prior to that date was achieved at his prior firm. Net returns are gross returns less the effective management fees. Returns for multi-year periods are annualized.

Indices are unmanaged and do not incurfees. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.


Returns may increase or decrease as a result of currency fluctuations.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.



#### CALENDAR YEAR RETURNS





Data Source: Loomis Sayles and the Frank Russell Company.

\* The benchmark for the Large Cap Growth Composite is the Russell 1000 Growth Index. Performance for the S&P 500 Index is shown as supplemental information.


The Portfolio Manager for the Large Cap Growth Composite joined Loomis Sayles on May 19, 2010, and performance prior to that date was achieved at his prior firm. Gross returns are net of trading costs. Net returns are gross returns less the effective management fees. Returns for multi-year periods are annualized.

Indices are unmanaged and do not incurfees. It is not possible to invest directly in an index.

Returns may increase or decrease as a result of currency fluctuations.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

#### LARGE CAP GROWTH COMPOSITE INCEPTION (7/1/2006) THROUGH 6/30/2022



Source: eASE Analytics System; eVestment Alliance is the ranking agency. \*Ranking out of 189 observations. (eVestment Alliance's Large Cap Gronth Universe.) Annualized performance is calculated as the geometric mean of the product's returns with respect to one year. Returnsbased data are gross of management fees and net of trading costs. The highest (or most favorable) percentile rank is 1, and the lowest (or least favorable) percentile rank is 100. Rankings are subject to change. Although we believe it is reliable, we cannot guarantee the accuracy of data from a third party source. This information cannot be copied or redistributed in any form. The Manager for the Large Cap Gronth Composite joined Loomis Sayles on May 19, 2010, and performance prior to that date was achieved at his prior firm.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results.



#### QUARTER END TRAILING RETURNS AND STATISTICS

#### PERFORMANCE IN NEGATIVE QUARTERS

Down Quarter	R1000G Gross Return	Loomis LCG Gross Return	Excess Gross Return (LS LCG vs R1000G)	Median LCG Peer Gross Return	Excess Gross Return (LS LCG vs Median LCG Peer)	Peer Universe Count
Q4 2007	-0.77%	-3.22%	-2.45%	0.07%	-3.29%	513
Q1 2008	-10.18%	-10.40%	-0.22%	-10.72%	0.32%	521
Q3 2008	-12.33%	-1.97%	10.36%	-12.66%	10.69%	504
Q4 2008	-22.79%	-18.69%	4.10%	-22.54%	3.85%	493
Q1 2009	-4.12%	-1.87%	2.25%	-4.51%	2.64%	487
Q2 2010	-11.75%	-12.35%	-0.62%	-11.72%	-0.65%	460
Q3 2011	-13.14%	-10.68%	2.46%	-14.50%	3.83%	433
Q2 2012	-4.02%	-3.86%	0.17%	-5.24%	1.38%	415
Q4 2012	-1.32%	3.26%	4.59%	-0.79%	4.05%	404
Q3 2015	-5.29%	-2.35%	2.93%	-5.97%	3.61%	363
Q4 2018	-15.89%	-11.58%	4.30%	-15.29%	3.70%	306
Q1 2020	-14.10%	-11.23%	2.87%	-14.37%	3.14%	274
Q1 2022	-9.04%	-7.59%	1.45%	-10.16%	2.57%	267
	Range		-2.45% to 10.36%		-3.29% to 10.69%	
	Median		2.46%		3.14%	

As of 3/31/2022. (Chart will be updated with 6/30/22 performance as it becomes available).

Source: Loomis Sayles, eASE Analytics System (eVestment Alliance's Large Cap Growth Universe. Managers reporting net of fee returns are excluded). Annualized performance is calculated as the geometric mean of the product's returns with respect to one year. Returns are gross of management fees and net of trading costs. Median is the middle value for the observations as of the end of each period shown. Although we believe it is reliable, we cannot guarantee the accuracy of data from a third party source. This information cannot be copied or redistributed in any form.

The Portfolio Manager for the Large Cap Growth Composite joined Loomis Sayles on May 19, 2010, and performance prior to that date was achieved at his prior firm.

Please see gross and net trailing returns shown above for additional details. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

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#### Endnotes

1 Gross returns are net of trading costs. Net returns are gross returns less the effective management fees. Returns for multi-year periods are annualized.

2 Lipper is the ranking agency. Ranking out of 153 observations; (Lipper's US Large Cap Gronth Universe). Lipper US Large Cap Gronth peer group information is based on mutual funds due to availability of data. Lipper rankings are based on gross returns. Lipper, a Thomson Reuters Company, is not responsible for the accuracy, reliability or completeness of the information obtained from Lipper. In addition, Lipper null not be liable for any loss or damage resulting from information obtained from Lipper or any of its affiliates.

3 Since Peak returns are shown for a representative account. Due to systems limitations it is difficult to analyze attribution on a composite basis. This representative account was selected because it closely reflects the Loomis Sayles Large Cap Growth investment strategy. Due to guideline restrictions and other factors, there is some dispersion between the returns of this account and other accounts managed in the Large Cap Growth investment style.

4 The Manager for the Large Cap Gronth Composite joined Loomis Sayles on May 19, 2010, and performance prior to that date was achieved at his prior firm.

5 Holding all else equal, the larger the discount between market price of a particular security and our estimate of its intrinsic value, the greater we view our margin of safety. Margin of safety is not an indication of the fund's safety as all investments carry risk, including risk of loss.
6 Calmar Ratio: This ratio is calculated by dividing the annualized manager return by the max drawdown over a selected time period. This is a commonly used hedge fund measure since such funds often employ hedging strategies to protect returns in down markets; hence, the max drawdown is expected to be lower. Generally, a higher Calmar Ratio is better as it indicates the manager has higher returns and/or lower max drawdown.

# This Commentary was originally published in March 2020. We have added current performance and data numbers to bring it up to date.

This analysis is based on historical data and does not predict future results. Therefore, the use of this type of information to make investment decisions has inherent limitations. There is no guarantee that future experience will be similar. The analysis reflected in this presentation is limited to certain periods. We make no representation that the experience of any other periods is comparable.

#### **Important Disclosures**

Indices are unmanaged and do not incur fees. It is not possible to invest directly in an index. Diversification does not ensure a profit or guarantee against a loss.

# There is no guarantee that the investment objective will be realized or that the strategy will generate positive or excess return.

Source: eASE Analytics System; eVestment Alliance is the ranking agency. (eVestment Alliance's Large Cap Gronth Universe.) Annualized performance is calculated as the geometric mean of the product's returns with respect to one year. Returns-based data are gross of management fees and net of trading costs. The highest (or most favorable) percentile rank is 1, and the lowest (or least favorable) percentile rank is 100. Rankings are subject to change. Although we believe it is reliable, we cannot guarantee the accuracy of data from a third party source. This information cannot be copied or redistributed in any form.

Benjamin Graham was a British-born American investor, economist, and professor. He is widely known as the "father of value investing", and wrote two of the founding texts in neoclassical investing: Security Analysis with David Dodd, and The Intelligent Investor.

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